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| De
volledige tekst van wapeninspecteur Hans Blix |
14-02-03
|
 De
toespraak van Hans Blix in de VN-Veiligheidsraad
"Mr. President, Since I reported to the Security Council
on 27 January, UNMOVIC has had two further weeks of operational
and analytical work in New York and active inspections
in Iraq. This brings the total period of inspections so
far to 11 weeks. Since then, we have also listened on
5 February to the presentation to the Council by the US
Secretary of State and the discussion that followed. Lastly,
Dr. ElBaradei and I have held another round of talks in
Baghdad with our counterparts and with Vice President
Ramadan on 8 and 9 February.
Work in Iraq
Let me begin today's briefing with a short account of
the work being performed by UNMOVIC in Iraq.
We have continued to build up our capabilities. The regional
office in Mosul is now fully operational at its temporary
headquarters. Plans for a regional office at Basra are
being developed. Our Hercules L-100 aircraft continues
to operate routine flights between Baghdad and Larnaca.
The eight helicopters are fully operational. With the
resolution of the problems raised by Iraq for transporting
minders into the no-fly zones, our mobility in these zones
has improved.
We expect to increase utilization of the helicopters.
The number of Iraqi minders during inspections had often
reached a ratio as high as five per inspector. During
the talks in January in Baghdad, the Iraqi side agreed
to keep the ratio to about one to one. The situation has
improved. Since we arrived in Iraq, we have conducted
more than 400 inspections covering more than 300 sites.
All inspections were performed without notice, and access
was almost always provided promptly. In no case have we
seen convincing evidence that the Iraqi side knew in advance
that the inspectors were coming.
The inspections have taken place throughout Iraq at industrial
sites, ammunition depots, research centres, universities,
presidential sites, mobile laboratories, private houses,
missile production facilities, military camps and agricultural
sites. At all sites which had been inspected before 1998,
re-baselining activities were performed. This included
the identification of the function and contents of each
building, new or old, at a site. It also included verification
of previously tagged equipment, application of seals and
tags, taking samples and discussions with the site personnel
regarding past and present activities. At certain sites,
ground-penetrating radar was used to look for underground
structures or buried equipment.
Through the inspections conducted so far, we have obtained
a good knowledge of the industrial and scientific landscape
of Iraq, as well as of its missile capability but, as
before, we do not know every cave and corner. Inspections
are effectively helping to bridge the gap in knowledge
that arose due to the absence of inspections between December
1998 and November 2002.
More than 200 chemical and more than 100 biological samples
have been collected at different sites. Three-quarters
of these have been screened using our own laboratory analytical
capabilities at the Baghdad Centre (BOMVIC). The results
to date have been consistent with Iraq's declarations.
We have now commenced the process of destroying approximately
50 litres of mustard gas declared by Iraq that was being
kept under UNMOVIC seal at the Muthanna site. One-third
of the quantity has already been destroyed. The laboratory
quantity of thiodiglycol, a mustard gas precursor, which
we found at another site, has also been destroyed.
The total number of staff in Iraq now exceeds 250 from
60 countries. This includes about 100 UNMOVIC inspectors,
15 IAEA inspectors, 50 aircrew, and 65 support staff.
Mr. President,
In my 27 January update to the Council, I said that it
seemed from our experience that Iraq had decided in principle
to provide cooperation on process, most importantly prompt
access to all sites and assistance to UNMOVIC in the establishment
of the necessary infrastructure. This impression remains,
and we note that access to sites has so far been without
problems, including those that had never been declared
or inspected, as well as to Presidential sites and private
residences.
In my last updating, I also said that a decision to cooperate
on substance was indispensable in order to bring, through
inspection, the disarmament task to completion and to
set the monitoring system on a firm course. Such cooperation,
as I have noted, requires more than the opening of doors.
In the words of resolution 1441 (2002) -- it requires
immediate, unconditional and active efforts by Iraq to
resolve existing questions of disarmament -- either by
presenting remaining proscribed items and programmes for
elimination or by presenting convincing evidence that
they have been eliminated. In the current situation, one
would expect Iraq to be eager to comply. While we were
in Baghdad, we met a delegation from the Government of
South Africa. It was there to explain how South Africa
gained the confidence of the world in its dismantling
of the nuclear weapons programme, by a wholehearted cooperation
over two years with IAEA inspectors. I have just learned
that Iraq has accepted an offer by South Africa to send
a group of experts for further talks.
How much, if any, is left of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction
and related proscribed items and programmes? So far, UNMOVIC
has not found any such weapons, only a small number of
empty chemical munitions, which should have been declared
and destroyed. Another matter - and one of great significance
- is that many proscribed weapons and items are not accounted
for. To take an example, a document, which Iraq provided,
suggested to us that some 1,000 tonnes of chemical agent
were "unaccounted for". One must not jump to the conclusion
that they exist. However, that possibility is also not
excluded. If they exist, they should be presented for
destruction. If they do not exist, credible evidence to
that effect should be presented.
We are fully aware that many governmental intelligence
organizations are convinced and assert that proscribed
weapons, items and programmes continue to exist. The US
Secretary of State presented material in support of this
conclusion. Governments have many sources of information
that are not available to inspectors. Inspectors, for
their part, must base their reports only on evidence,
which they can, themselves, examine and present publicly.
Without evidence, confidence cannot arise.
Mr. President,
In my earlier briefings, I have noted that significant
outstanding issues of substance were listed in two Security
Council documents from early 1999 (S/1999/94 and S/1999/356)
and should be well known to Iraq. I referred, as examples,
to the issues of anthrax, the nerve agent VX and long-range
missiles, and said that such issues "deserve to be taken
seriously by Iraq rather than being brushed aside". The
declaration submitted by Iraq on 7 December, despite its
large volume, missed the opportunity to provide the fresh
material and evidence needed to respond to the open questions.
This is perhaps the most important problem we are facing.
Although I can understand that it may not be easy for
Iraq in all cases to provide the evidence needed, it is
not the task of the inspectors to find it. Iraq itself
must squarely tackle this task and avoid belittling the
questions.
Work in New York
In my January update to the Council, I referred to the
Al Samoud 2 and the Al Fatah missiles, reconstituted casting
chambers, construction of a missile engine test stand
and the import of rocket engines, which were all declared
to UNMOVIC by Iraq. I noted that the Al Samoud 2 and the
Al Fatah could very well represent prima facie cases of
proscribed missile systems, as they had been tested to
ranges exceeding the 150-kilometre limit set by the Security
Council. I also noted that Iraq had been requested to
cease flight tests of these missiles until UNMOVIC completed
a technical review.
Earlier this week, UNMOVIC missile experts met for two
days with experts from a number of Member States to discuss
these items. The experts concluded that, based on the
data provided by Iraq, the two declared variants of the
Al Samoud 2 missile were capable of exceeding 150 kilometres
in range. This missile system is therefore proscribed
for Iraq pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) and the monitoring
plan adopted by resolution 715 (1991). |
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